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Abstract
In several contexts, such as finance and politics, people make choices that are relevant for others but irrelevant for oneself.
Focusing on decision-making under risk, we compared monetary choices made for one’s own interest with choices made on
behalf of an anonymous individual. Consistent with the previous literature, other-interest choices were characterized by an
increased gambling propensity. We also investigated choice stochasticity, which captures how much decisions vary in similar
conditions. An aspect related to choice stochasticity is how much decisions are tuned to the option values, and we found that this
was higher during self-interest than during other-interest choices. This effect was observed only in individuals who reported a
motivation to distribute rewards unequally, suggesting that it may (at least partially) depend on a motivation to make accurate
decisions for others. Our results indicate that, during decision-making under risk, choices for other people are characterized by a
decreased tuning to the values of the options, in addition to enhanced risk seeking.
Keywords Social decision-making . Decision-making under risk . Choice stochasticity . Decisions for others . Context effect
Our decisions usually have their principal consequence for our-
selves but often also for other people. There is substantial vari-
ation in the relative influence that a choice has on the self and on
others (Crockett, Kurth-Nelson, Siegel, Dayan, & Dolan, 2014;
Engel, 2011; Engle-Warnick & Slonim, 2004; Everett, Faber,
Crockett, & De Dreu, 2015; Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004; Henrich
et al., 2010; Nowak, Page, & Sigmund, 2000; Rand & Nowak,
2013; Rand, Greene, &Nowak, 2012; Rand et al., 2014; Ruff &
Fehr, 2014; Selten & Stoecker, 1986). Some contexts require
decisions on behalf of other people that have no or minimal
implications for the self. For instance, in finance the decisions
of executive officers have only marginal consequences for
themselves as compared to shareholders. Recent research has
examined risk taking behavior during choices made for others.
Considering conditions involving monetary amounts, a stronger
risk aversion has been reported during choices made for the self
(choiceS) relative to choices made for an anonymous individual
(choiceO) (Chakravarty, Harrison, Ernan, & Rutström, 2011;
Hsee & Weber, 1997; Mengarelli, Moretti, Faralla, Vindras, &
Sirigu, 2014; Pollai & Kirchler, 2012; Pollmann, Potters, &
Trautmann, 2014; but see Eriksen & Kvaløy, 2009; Reynolds,
Joseph, & Sherwood, 2009). However, aside from risk prefer-
ences, other important factors may distinguish these two condi-
tions—for example, choice stochasticity (reflecting the variabil-
ity of choice with similar decisions). A possibility is that choice
stochasticity increases during choiceO relative to choiceS. This
could be due to a decreasedmotivation tomake accurate choices
during choiceO (Engel, 2011), leading to a more frequent sam-
pling of nonpreferred options. Another factor that may account
for more stochastic decisions during choiceO may be a higher
uncertainty about others’ preferences than about one’s own, a
factor that may be particularly relevant when the other is an
anonymous individual.
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In this study, we aimed to elucidate the mechanisms that
distinguish choiceS and choiceO during decision-making un-
der risk. We employed a novel gambling task that allowed us
to separate factors reflecting risk preference from factors
reflecting choice stochasticity, and to assess their respective
role when comparing choiceS and choiceO.
The amount of reward available to other people influences
subjectivewell-being and value-based choice (Boyce, Brown,&
Moore, 2010; Clark & Oswald, 1996; Luttmer, 2005; Rutledge,
de Berker, Espenhahn, Dayan, & Dolan, 2016). However, the
nature of the influence of the reward available to others on
choice remains largely unclear. Here, we investigated this by
manipulating the reward context (defined as the average reward
presented within a block) both for the self and for the other. In
previous studies focusing on choice for the self alone, manipu-
lation of the reward context for the self induced participants to
consider the same reward amount as more valuable in a low
reward context (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Kőszegi &
Rabin, 2006; Louie, Khaw, & Glimcher, 2013; Martinelli,
Rigoli, Dolan, & Shergill, 2018; Rigoli, Chew, Dayan, &
Dolan, 2018; Rigoli, Friston, & Dolan, 2016; Rigoli, Friston,
Martinelli, et al., 2016; Rigoli, Mathys, Friston, & Dolan, 2017;
Rigoli, Rutledge, Chew, et al., 2016; Rigoli, Rutledge, Dayan, &
Dolan, 2016; Stewart, 2009; Stewart, Chater, & Brown, 2006).
Intuitively, this implies that the fishes caught today will look
better if they are more than the fishes caught yesterday. A pos-
sibility we analyzed here is that the context for the self and the
context for the other play a similar role, predicting that a reward
will be considered as more valuable when the context of the self
and the context of the other have both low value, as compared to
when only one has low value. Intuitively, this would predict that
the fishes caught today will look better if they are more than the
fishes you caught yesterday, but also more than the fishes an-
other person caught yesterday.
Method
Participants
Forty healthy right-handed adults (25 females, 15 males; 20–
40 years of age, mean age 24) participated in the study. Such
sample size was selected before data collection for performing
paired-sample t tests to investigate differences between con-
ditions with a medium effect size (Cohen’s d = 0.5), and as-
suming a (two-tailed) significance threshold of .05 and a sta-
tistical power of .85 (a procedure that requires 36 participants
minimum). All participants had normal or corrected-to-normal
vision. None had a history of head injury, a diagnosis of any
neurological or psychiatric condition, or was currently on
medication affecting the central nervous system. The study
was approved by the University College of London
Research Ethics Committee. All participants provided written
informed consent and were paid for participating. Participants
were tested at the Wellcome Trust Centre for Neuroimaging at
the University College London.
Experimental paradigm and procedure
Participants performed a computer-based decision-making
task lasting approximately 40 min (Fig. 1). On each trial, a
monetary amount (referred to as the trial amount) that
changed trial by trial (600 trials overall) was presented in the
center of the screen, and participants had to choose whether to
accept half of this amount for sure (by pressing a left button)
or to gamble (by pressing a right button). The possible out-
comes of the gamble were always either zero reward or the full
monetary amount, each with a 50–50 chance. Therefore, on
every trial the certain option and the gamble always had the
same expected value (EV; corresponding to the sum of all
possible outcomes of an option, each multiplied by its proba-
bility). We adopted this design because it allowed us to sepa-
rate factors related to risk preference from factors related to
choice stochasticity (see below).
For half of the trials, the choice was made for self-interest
(choiceS). At the end of the experiment, one outcome was ran-
domly selected among those received in choiceS trials, and this
was paid out to the chooser. For the other half of the trials, the
choice was made in the interest of another person (choiceO),
because at the end of the experiment one outcome was random-
ly selected among those from choiceO trials and paid out to the
next participant involved in the study (and not to the chooser).
Specifically, for participant x the total payment resulted from
averaging an outcome drawn from the choiceS trials of that
participant and an outcome drawn from the choiceO trials of
participant x–1 (plus a £5 baseline payment). Participants were
fully instructed about this payment method. After playing the
task, the first participant (unaware of being the first participant
in the study) was told that the payment dependent on the other
player was £5. ChoiceS and choiceO alternated pseudorandomly
and were signaled to participants: On each trial, the trial amount
was presented together with either the word Bself^ or Bother^
(with the text in either green or blue for self and other, and with
the color counterbalanced across participants).
The task was organized in short blocks, each comprising
ten trials (five choiceS and five choiceO). Each block was
associated with a context condition that determined the possi-
ble EVs associated with the block. The context was simulta-
neously manipulated on the basis of high-value and low-value
conditions for both self (highS vs. lowS) and other (highO vs.
lowO). This resulted in four context conditions: highS &
highO, highS & lowO, lowS & highO, and lowS & lowO. The
possible EVs were £1, £3, and £5 for the low-value contexts,
and £3, £5, and £7 for the high-value contexts. For example,
for the lowS & highO condition, the possible EVs were £1, £3,
and £5 for choiceS, and £3, £5, and £7 for choiceO. The EVs
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used here were selected because of evidence showing that they
elicited an effect of context during choice for the self (Rigoli,
Friston, & Dolan, 2016).
The context conditions for both choiceS and choiceO were
signaled by the corresponding average trial amounts (preced-
ed by either the word Bself^ or Bother^ in the corresponding
text color; see Fig. 1), displayed in brackets at the top of the
screen throughout the block. These trial amounts were £6 and
£10 (corresponding to £3 and £5 EV) for the low- and high-
value contexts, respectively. Before a new block started, the
statement BNew set^ appeared for 2 s, followed by the context
condition (average trial amounts), shown for 2 s. Next, the
trial amount of the first trial (indicating also the choiceS or
choiceO condition; see above) was displayed, followed imme-
diately after a response by the outcome of the choice, shown
for 1 s. The average amounts remained on the screen during an
intertrial interval lasting one-and-a-half second. The orders of
b locks , con tex t cond i t i on , and ou tcomes were
pseudorandomized.
We also assessed situational and personality factors so as to
explore a possible link between these factors and any putative
difference between choiceS and choiceO. These factors indi-
cated how much one cared about choiceS versus choiceO.
After the task, participants indicated (on a 1–5 scale) their
motivation to distributemoney equally to the self and the other
person during the gambling task. Also, participants filled in
the Social Dominance Orientation (SDO) questionnaire
(Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994), which captures
a preference for hierarchy within the social system and a pre-
disposition toward anti-egalitarianism.
Model-based analysis
We compared different generative models of choice behavior
by estimating separately, for each model considered, the best-
fitting parameters for each participant and summing the neg-
ative log-likelihoods of the data, given the model and the best-
fitting parameters across participants. Parameter estimation
was performed using the fminseachbnd function in Matlab.
For model comparison, we compared more complex
models with nested models—namely models in which one
or more parameters were fixed at zero. To do this, we used
the standard approach of the likelihood-ratio test (Casella &
Berger, 2002; Daw, 2011), which allows for a comparison of
nested models. This analysis is based on the fact that the
difference in the negative log-likelihoods times two (2d) be-
tween a nested and a more complex model follows a chi-
square distribution in which the number of degrees of freedom
is equal to the number of additional parameters of the more
complex model. A chi-square test could then be performed to
estimate the probability that the observed 2d was due to
chance, under the null hypothesis that the data were generated
by the nested model, allowing for acceptance or rejection of
that null hypothesis.
Results
Risk preference
The average gambling proportions were .48 during choiceS
(SD = .23; min = 0, max = .91) and .57 during choiceO (SD
= .24; min = 0, max = 0.99). This resulted in an average
gambling proportion that (i) was not different from .5 during
choiceS [Fig. 2a; t(39) = – 0.54, p = .59; two-tailed p = .05 is
used as the significance threshold]; (ii) showed a significance
trend toward being greater than .5 during choiceO [Fig. 2a;
t(39) = 1.78, p = .082]; and (iii) was smaller for choiceS than
for choiceO (Fig. S1 in suplementary materials; z = – 2.05, p =
.040; for paired-sample comparisons, a t test was used if the
Shapiro–Wilk test for normality was not significant; other-
wise, a Wilcoxon signed rank test was used). The average
Fig. 1 Gambling task. On each trial, a monetary amount (referred as the
trial amount) was presented, and participants had to choose either half of
it for sure (by pressing a left button) or a 50–50 gamble returning either
zero reward or the full monetary amount (by pressing a right button). This
ensured that the options had equivalent expected values (EVs). In
different trials, choice was made either in the interest of the self
(choiceS) or of another participant (choiceO). The task was organized in
short blocks, each comprising ten trials (with five choiceS and five
choiceO trials each). Each block was associated with a context condition
that determined the possible EVs associated with the block. The context
was manipulated simultaneously in high-value and low-value conditions,
relative to both choiceS (highS vs. lowS) and choiceO (highO vs. lowO).
This resulted in four conditions for the context: highS & highO, highS &
lowO, lowS & highO, and lowS & lowO. The possible EVs were £1, £3,
and £5 for the low-value contexts, and £3, £5, and £7 for the high-value
contexts. During an intertrial interval lasting one-and-a-half second, the
context condition of both the self and other was signaled by the
corresponding average trial amounts (preceded by either the word Bself^
or Bother,^ one of which was associated with green text and the other with
blue text, with the colors counterbalanced across participants), displayed
in brackets at the top of the screen. Possible average trial amounts were £6
and £10 (corresponding to £3 and £5 EV) for the low- and high-value
contexts, respectively. Next, the trial amount of the first trial was
displayed and choiceS or choiceO was signaled by the word Bself^ or
Bother.^ Right after a choice had been made, the outcome appeared for
1 s
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gambling proportions for choiceS and choiceO were correlated
[Fig. 2a; ρ(40) = .591, p = .001; Spearman’s correlation was
used for our analyses because it is less affected by outliers].
We estimated two logistic regression models of gambling
choice (gambling and choice of the certain option were coded
as 1 and 0, respectively): one model for choiceS and a different
model for choiceO. Each model had the trial EV as a predictor
(this was the only predictor in the model; remember that the two
options on a trial always had equivalent EVs). Considering each
participant individually, the beta weight of the logistic regression
associated with EV was significantly different from zero for 27
and 22 participants during choiceS and choiceO, respectively.
Across participants, the average beta weights were – 0.025 dur-
ing choiceS (SD = 0.61; min = – 1.28, max = 1.75) and – 0.031
during choiceO (SD = 0.56; min = – 1.74, max = 1.70). This
resulted in the beta weight not being different from zero for either
choiceS [t(39) = – 0.256, p = .799] or choiceO [t(39) = – 0.358, p
= .723], with no difference between the two conditions (Fig. S1
in supplementary materials; z = 0.385, p = .700). A correlation
was evident between the beta weights of the two conditions [Fig.
S2 in supplementary materials; ρ(40) = .749, p < .001].
Standard economic theories postulate that choice results
from a nonlinear value function (or an equivalent mean–var-
iance account) mapping an objective reward amount to its
underlying subjective value (e.g., Kahneman & Tversky,
1979). In our task (which focuses on gains), such accounts
predict that an individual with a concave function will be
overall risk-averse and more likely to gamble in small- than
in large-EV trials. In addition, a more concave value function
would increase risk aversion as well as a preference for gam-
bling in small- as compared to large-EV trials. Conversely, an
individual with a convex function will be overall risk-seeking
and more likely to gamble with large- than with small-EV
trials. A more convex value function would increase risk-
seeking and a preference for gambling with large- as com-
pared to small-EV trials. In other words, standard accounts
based on a value function predict a correlation across individ-
uals between the overall gambling proportion and the prefer-
ence to gamble for large versus small EVs. When we tested
this prediction in our data, we observed that average gambling
and the EV-related beta weight were uncorrelated with each
other, both for choiceS [ρ(40) = .025, p = .877] and choiceO
Fig. 2 (a) Relationship between the proportion of gambling choices
during decisions made for the self (choiceS) and the proportion of
gambling choices during decisions made for the other (choiceO). The
red line indicates equal proportions of gambling for choiceS and
choiceO. The data show a positive correlation [ρ(40) = .591, p = .001]
and a smaller gambling proportion for choiceS than for choiceO (z = –
2.05, p = .040). (b) Relationship between EV sensitivity (i.e., the absolute
beta weight associated with EVin a logistic regressionmodel of gambling
choice) for choiceS and EV sensitivity for choiceO. The red line indicates
equal EV sensitivities for choiceS and choiceO. The data show greater
gambling sensitivity for choiceS than for choiceO [t(39) = 2.12, p = .040].
(c) Relationship between score on the Social Dominance Orientation
(SDO) questionnaire and the difference in average gambling between
choiceS and choiceO [nonsignificant; ρ(40) = – .232, p = .149]. (d)
Relationship between SDO score and the difference in EV sensitivity
between choiceS and choiceO [ρ(40) = .458, p = .003]
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[ρ(40) = – .112, p = .491]. This replicated previous findings of
ours (Martinelli et al., 2018; Rigoli et al., 2018; Rigoli,
Friston, & Dolan, 2016; Rigoli, Friston, Martinelli, et al.,
2016; Rigoli, Rutledge, Chew, et al., 2016; Rigoli, Rutledge,
Dayan, & Dolan, 2016) and is not explained within the frame-
work of a nonlinear value function, as in standard economic
models.
Choice stochasticity
In addition to examining risk preference, we aimed to explore
choice stochasticity (i.e., how much decisions vary in similar
conditions) and to assess whether this differed when compar-
ing choiceS and choiceO. This difference can be predicted if,
during choiceO, we hypothesize that agents are less motivated
to make accurate decisions or are more uncertain about the
other person’s preferences.
We estimated two aspects of choice stochasticity. First, we
considered the distance between an individual’s average gam-
bling and 50% gambling (i.e., due to random choices). Across
participants, the averages for this measure were 18% during
choiceS and 20% during choiceO, with no difference between
the two conditions [t(39) = – 0.795, p = .431]. Second, we
computed the absolute beta weight of the logistic regressions
associated with EV (see above), which we refer to as EV
sensitivity. This reports how much choice varies as a function
of EV, independent of whether the influence is positive or neg-
ative. Note that increased choice stochasticity results in aweaker
influence of EV on choice (i.e., a smaller EV sensitivity), be-
cause it implies that choice is more variable for similar EVs.
Across participants, the average EV sensitivity was larger dur-
ing choiceS (mean = .51) than during choiceO (mean = .46) [Fig.
2b and Fig. S1 in supplementary materials; t(39) = 2.12, p =
.040]. These data highlight a difference in choice stochasticity
between choiceS and choiceO that is specific to EV sensitivity.
Comparing the first and second halves of the task, we also
analyzed whether time influenced choice behavior or
interacted with the effect of self–other condition. However,
we found no evidence of any interaction between time and
self–other condition, suggesting that the effects of self–other
condition did not vary systematically during the task (see the
supplementary materials).
Questionnaires
Our results indicated that, for choiceS as opposed to choiceO,
individuals were more attuned to the EV at stake. This effect
may be partially dependent on an increased motivation to
perform well during choiceS as compared to choiceO. To test
this hypothesis, we investigated the relationship between (i)
the difference in EV sensitivity for choiceS versus choiceO and
(ii) the difference in how much individuals cared about the
self’s versus others’ outcomes. We measured the latter
variable with questionnaires about a preference for equality,
which by definition captures a difference between caring for
the self versus others. Both situational and personality esti-
mates of a preference for equality were collected. The former
estimate was assessed through a posttask question in which
each participant was asked to indicate (on a 1–5 scale) the
motivation to distributemoney equally to the self and the other
person during the gambling task. Personality factors were
assessed by administration of the SDO questionnaire (Pratto
et al., 1994; see the Method section), which captures a prefer-
ence for hierarchy within the social system and a predisposi-
tion for anti-egalitarianism. The posttask question score and
the SDO score were correlated with each other [ρ(39) = –
.359, p = .025; the score for the posttask question was unavail-
able for one participant who terminated the task before the
end]. The data showed correlations between the difference in
EV sensitivity for choiceS minus choiceO and both the
posttask question score [ρ(39) = – .377, p = .018] and the
SDO score [Fig. 2d; ρ(40) = .458, p = .003].
The correlation analysis left open the question of whether
the difference in EV sensitivity for choiceS minus choiceO was
positive for all participants, independent of their posttask
question scores (and SDO scores). To address this question,
participants were separated into high (score > 3; n = 18) and
low (score < 4; n = 21) posttask question score groups, and a
larger EV sensitivity for choiceS than for choiceO was ob-
served in the low posttask question score group [t(20) =
3.50, p = .002] but not in the high posttask question score
group [t(17) = – 0.51, p = .960). On the basis of a median
split, participants were grouped in high- and low-SDO-score
groups, and a larger EV sensitivity for choiceS than for
choiceO was observed for the high-SDO-score group [t(19)
= 2.96, p = .008] but not for the low-SDO-score group [t(19)
= – 0.192, p = .850].
We also examined the relationship between the difference
in average gambling for choiceS minus choiceO and the ques-
tionnaire data. We observed no evidence of any relationship of
average gambling with the question score [ρ(39) = .028, p =
.866] or with the SDO score [Fig. 2c; ρ(40) = – .232, p = .149].
In addition, average gambling and EV sensitivity for choiceS
minus choiceOwere also uncorrelated with each other [ρ(40) =
– .031, p = .850]. We emphasize that our sample was adequate
only for testing large-correlation effect sizes (ρ > .5, assuming
a power of .8), implying that further research will be needed to
test for smaller effect sizes.
Context effect
In our task, the average trial EV of blocks varied due to a
simultaneous manipulation of context for both choiceS
(highS vs. lowS) and choiceO (highO vs. lowO). This allowed
us to assess whether context exerted an influence on choice
behavior for EVs common across different contexts. Thus, in
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this analysis we investigated the relationship between the EV-
related gambling preference (i.e., the beta weight associated
with EVof the logistic regression model of gambling) and the
difference in gambling for common EVs across low- versus
high-value contexts. A positive relationship between these
two variables was evident in previous studies (Rigoli et al.,
2018; Rigoli, Friston, & Dolan, 2016; Rigoli, Friston,
Martinelli, et al., 2016; Rigoli et al., 2017; Rigoli, Rutledge,
Chew, et al., 2016; Rigoli, Rutledge, Dayan, & Dolan, 2016),
indicating that participants who gambled more with larger
EVs also gambled more when the same EVs were relatively
large for the context, whereas participants who gambled more
with smaller EVs also gambled more when the same EVs
were relatively small for the context. This is consistent with
a normalization effect exerted by context, because it entails
that the very same objective EVs are attributed either higher or
lower value, depending on their relative value within the con-
text. However, previous studies had manipulated only a self
context and analyzed the choiceS condition alone (Rigoli,
Friston, & Dolan, 2016; Rigoli, Friston, Martinelli, et al.,
2016; Rigoli, Rutledge, Chew, et al., 2016; Rigoli, Rutledge,
Dayan, & Dolan, 2016), and the impact of the average con-
textual reward for a choice made on behalf of another person
remained an open question. Here, by manipulating the context
for both choiceS and choiceO, we could address this question.
Our initial prediction was that the context of the self and the
context of the other would exert similar influences and that
these influences would involve both choiceS and choiceO. For
example, this reasoning implies that, during both choiceS and
choiceO, the same EV would be considered more valuable
when lowS and lowO both applied than when either applied
alone. As above, we emphasize that our sample was adequate
only for testing large correlation effect sizes (ρ > .5, assuming
a power of .8), implying that further research will be needed to
test for smaller effect sizes in the face of null correlation ef-
fects found here (see below).
For choiceS, we observed a correlation between the EV-
related gambling preference (i.e., the beta weight associated
with EV of the logistic regression model of gambling for
choiceS) and the difference in gambling for common EVs in
lowS versus highS contexts (independent of the context con-
dition for choiceO) [Fig. 3a; ρ(40) = .318, p = .045]. This
replicated previous findings (Rigoli, Friston, & Dolan, 2016;
Rigoli, Friston, Martinelli, et al., 2016; Rigoli, Rutledge,
Chew, et al., 2016; Rigoli, Rutledge, Dayan, & Dolan, 2016)
showing an effect consistent with a value normalization
exerted by the self context on choiceS. However, considering
choiceS, no correlation emerged between the EV-related gam-
bling preference and the difference in gambling for common
EVs in lowO versus highO contexts (independent of the con-
text condition for choiceS) [Fig. 3b; ρ(40) = – .024, p = .884].
There was no correlation, either, between the EV-related gam-
bling preference and gambling for the interaction between self
and other context (i.e., [lowself – highself] – [lowother –
highother]) [ρ(40) = .156, p = .335]. This indicates that
choiceS was not affected by the other person’s context. This
suggests that during choiceS, the same EV was not perceived
as more valuable during lowO than during highO, which is
inconsistent with our initial prediction.
For choiceO, we observed a correlation between the EV-
related gambling preference (this time estimated with a logis-
tic regression model of gambling for choiceO) and the differ-
ence in gambling for common EVs in lowO versus highO
contexts (independent of the context condition for choiceS)
[Fig. 3d; ρ(40) = .381, p = .015]. However, again considering
choiceO, there was no correlation between the EV-related
gambling preference and the difference in gambling for com-
mon EVs in lowS versus highS contexts (independent of the
context condition for choiceO) [Fig. 3c; ρ(40) = .193, p =
.232]. No correlation emerged, either, between the EV-
related gambling preference and gambling for the interaction
between self and other context (i.e., [lowself – highself] –
[lowother – highother]) [ρ(40) = – .114, p = .484]. This suggests
that during choiceO, the same EV was not perceived as more
valuable during lowS than during highS, which is also incon-
sistent with our initial prediction.
Overall, these observations indicate that the context of the
self affects choiceS but not choiceO, whereas the context of the
other person has a similar influence, but on choiceO and not
choiceS.
Model-based analysis
We deployed the same computational model as in our previ-
ous study (Rigoli, Friston, & Dolan, 2016; Rigoli, Friston,
Martinelli, et al., 2016; Rigoli, Rutledge, Chew, et al., 2016;
Rigoli, Rutledge, Dayan, & Dolan, 2016) to characterize the
mechanisms underlying choice behavior (see the Method
section). As compared to the versions used before, here we
extended the model to account for the influence of the con-
texts of both self and other. The goal of the model-based
analysis was to provide insight into the computations under-
lying the effects found above, especially in relation to EV
sensitivity and the influence of context. Specifically, the mod-
el provides a clear formalization of EV sensitivity, cast in
terms of how much choice is influenced by the options’ var-
iance, and provides a clear definition of the influence of con-
text, cast in terms of subtractive normalization (see below).
The model was inspired by a standard mean–variance return
account [in which the value of an option x is V(x) = mean(x) +
α variance(x)], with the inclusion of a further bias effect linked
to a disposition to gamble. Taking A as the sure monetary
outcome (received by choosing half of the trial amount), the
value of the sure option is VSURE = A, and the value of the
gamble is VGAMB = A +α A
2 + μ. A value function parameter
α determines whether the reward variance was attractive (α >
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0) or not (α < 0), and a gambling bias parameter μ determines a
baseline propensity to gamble, capturingwhether gambling was
attractive (μ > 0) or not (μ < 0). The probability of choosing the
gamble is given by a sigmoidal choice rule σ(VGAMB −
VCERT) = 1/[1 + exp(−VGAMB + VSURE)]. The role of each pa-
rameter is explained in Fig. S3 in supplementary materials,
illustrating choice behavior for simulated agents with different
parameter sets. Note the model implies that VGAMB −
VCERT =αA
2 + μ. This is analogous to a simple logistic regres-
sion having the value function parameter α as its slope and the
gambling bias parameter μ as its intercept, where the value of
the sure option A corresponds to the trial EV (Rigoli, Friston, &
Dolan, 2016; Rigoli, Friston, Martinelli, et al., 2016; Rigoli,
Rutledge, Chew, et al., 2016; Rigoli, Rutledge, Dayan, &
Dolan, 2016). In other words, the computational model is sim-
ilar to the simple logistic regression adopted above, and the
value function parameter α is similar to the EV-related
parameter in the logistic regression. An implication is that the
absolute value of α is expected to capture EV sensitivity, and
hence will differ when comparing choiceO and choiceS and
show a relationship with the questionnaire measures.
First we assessed whether this model (including both the
gambling bias parameter μ and the value function parameter
α) was better than simpler models in which either μ or α was
fixed at zero. A likelihood ratio test showed that our model
was favored over a random model [Table 1; Model 4 vs.
Model 1: χ2(80) = 4,778, p < .001], a model with α = 0
[Table 1; Model 4 vs. Model 2: χ2(40) = 4,026, p < .001]
and a model with μ = 0 [Table 1; Model 4 vs. Model 3:
χ2(40) = 3,592, p < .001]. Note that a model with μ = 0
(and with α alone as a free parameter) is the one predicted
by standard economic theories of choice, proposing that a
value function alone is sufficient to explain choice behavior.
Contrary to these theories, this analysis shows that both a
Fig. 3 (a) Considering choices made for the self (choiceS), relationship
between (i) the effect of EVon gambling preference (i.e., the beta weight
associated with the EVof the logistic regression model of gambling for
choiceS) and (ii) the effect of the context of the self, equal to the difference
in gambling for common EVs in a low-value context of the self (lowS)
versus a high-value context of the self (highS) [ρ(40) = .381, p = .015]. (b)
Again considering choiceS, relationship between (i) the effect of EV on
gambling preference and (ii) the effect of the context of the other, equal to
the difference in gambling for common EVs in a low-value context of the
other (lowO) versus a high-value context of the other (highO)
[nonsignificant; ρ(40) = – .024, p = .884]. (c) Considering choices
made for the other (choiceO), relationship between the effect of EV on
gambling preference (this time estimated with a logistic regression model
of gambling for choiceO) and the effect of context of the self
[nonsignificant; ρ(40) = .193, p = .232]. (d) Again considering choiceO,
relationship between the effect of EV on gambling preference and the
effect of context of the other [ρ(40) = .381, p = .015]
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gambling bias μ and a value function parameter α drove
choice behavior in our task. This is also consistent with the
observation of a lack of correlation between the average gam-
bling and the EV-dependent gambling (i.e., the beta weight
associated with the EV of the logistic regression model) re-
ported above. In addition, this result suggests that participants
overall felt that their choices were consequential, since their
behavior was dependent on the reward at stake (as is evident
from the selection of a model with α). This is also consistent
with the results of the logistic regression analysis of choices
reported above, showing that 27 participants (for choiceS) and
22 participants (for choiceO) had a beta weight associated with
an EV significantly different from zero.
Second, we investigated whether different value function
parameters α and gambling bias parameters μ were used for
choiceS and choiceO. We considered a model implementing
αS and μS for choiceS and αO and μO for choiceO and, on the
basis of a likelihood ratio test, this model was favored to a
model in which αS = αO [Table 1; Model 7 vs. Model 5:
χ2(40) = 234, p < .001]; to a model in which μS = μO
[Table 1; Model 7 vs. Model 6: χ2(40) = 334, p < .001]; and
to a model in which both αS = αO and μS = μO [Table 1;
Model 7 vs. Model 4: χ2(80) = 1,532, p < .001].
Third, we probed the computational mechanisms underly-
ing the effect of context, using φS = 1 and φS = 0 to indicate
highS and lowS, respectively, and φO = 1 and φO = 0 to indi-
cate highO and lowO, respectively.We compared the following
models that implemented different influences of context. One
model (Table 1: Model 8) prescribed that, for both choiceO
and choiceS trials, only the context of the self φS counted,
implying VSURE = A − τφS and VGAMB = A − τφS + α (A
− τφS)2 + μ. Another model (Table 1: Model 9) prescribed
that, for both choiceO and choiceS trials, only the context of
the other χO counted, implying VSURE = A − τφO and
VGAMB = A − τφO + α (A − τφO)2 + μ. Another model
(Table 1: Model 10) prescribed that the context of the self φS
counted for choiceS and the context of the other φO counted
for choiceO. Another model (Table 1: Model 11) prescribed
that both the context of the self φS and the context of the other
φO counted for all trials, so that VSURE = A − τ[(φS +φO)/2]
and VGAMB = A − τ[(φS + φO)/2] + α(A − τ[(φS + φO)/2])2 +
μ. Given that these models all had equal numbers of parame-
ters (i.e.,αS,αO, μS, μO, and τ), the favored model was simply
the one with the smallest negative log-likelihood. This turned
out to be the model in which the context of the self φS counted
for choiceS and the context of the other φO counted for
choiceO (Table 1: Model 10). In addition, a likelihood ratio
test showed that this model was favored to a simpler (nested)
model in which τ = 0 [Table 1; Model 10 vs. Model 7: χ2(40)
= 166, p < .001] and to a model in which two different context
parameters were implemented (τS for choiceS and τO for
choiceO) but that was equivalent otherwise [Table 1; Model
12 vs. Model 10: χ2(40) = 32, p = .812].
The model favored by the model comparison (Table 1:
Model 10) included αS (median value: .064), αO (median
value: .877), μS (median value: – .024), μO (median value: –
.014), and τ (median value: .47) as free parameters and pre-
scribed that the context of the self φS counted for choiceS and
the context of the other φO counted for choiceO. As we ex-
plained above, the value function parameter αwas expected to
Table 1 Computational models of choice behavior
Model Free Parameter N Free Parameters Neg LL Pseudo-R2
1 Random 0 15,249 0
2 μ 1 14,873 .106
3 α 1 14,656 .119
4 μ α 2 12,860 .227
5 μS μOα 3 12,211 .266
6 μ αS αO 3 12,261 .263
7 μS μO αS αO 4 12,094 .273
8 μS μOαS αO τ
(effect of φS in all trials)
5 12,044 .276
9 μS μO αS αO τ
(effect of φO in all trials)
5 12,061 .275
10 μS μO αS αO τ
(effect of φS in choiceS; effect of φO in choiceO)
5 12,011** .278
11 μS μO αS αO τ
(effect of both φS and φO in all trials)
5 12,046 .276
12 μS μO αS αO τS τO
(effect of φS in choiceS; effect of φO in choiceO)
6 11,995 .279
The second column indicates the free parameters, the third column indicates the number of free parameters per subject. The fourth column indicates the
negative log likelihood (Neg LL) of the choice data, given the model and the estimated parameters. Themodel selected bymodel comparison (Model 10)
is marked with asterisks. The fifth column reports pseudo-R2 , a quantity that indicates the absolute variability explained by the model
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be analogous to the EV-related weight of the logistic regres-
sion model of gambling (see above). Replicating previous
findings (Rigoli, Friston, & Dolan, 2016; Rigoli, Friston,
Martinelli, et al., 2016; Rigoli, Rutledge, Chew, et al., 2016;
Rigoli, Rutledge, Dayan, & Dolan, 2016), the data confirmed
that these two measures were highly correlated [ρ(40) = .92, p
< .001 for choiceS; ρ(40) = .93, p < .001 for choiceO]. In
addition, the difference between the absolute values of αS
and αO (analogous to the difference in EV sensitivity) was
larger than zero (z = 2.06, p = .040) and was correlated with
the posttask question [ρ(39) = – .362, p = .018] and with SDO
scores [ρ(40) = .432, p = .006].
To validate our model comparison further, we also per-
formed control analyses on data simulated with the model
(reported in the supplementary material). Collectively, these
analyses demonstrated that the model favored by model com-
parison replicated the main behavioral findings, supporting
the idea that it captures key mechanisms involved in our task.
Discussion
Investigating decision-making for the interest of somebody
else is important to understanding complex social situations.
Decreased risk aversion has been observed during monetary
choices made for an anonymous individual (Chakravarty
et al., 2011; Hsee & Weber, 1997; Mengarelli et al., 2014;
Pollai & Kirchler, 2012; Pollmann et al., 2014; but see
Eriksen & Kvaløy, 2009; Reynolds et al., 2009). We extended
this literature examining the specific contributions of risk pref-
erence and choice stochasticity. Comparing choiceS versus
choiceo, we found lower average gambling and increased
EV sensitivity (i.e., choices being more dependent on the
EV at stake). The latter finding highlights a difference in one
aspect related to choice stochasticity, in that a decreased EV
sensitivity implies a higher choice variability for similar EVs.
The difference in EV sensitivity could arise from the fact
that the motivation to make appropriate choices may be stron-
ger during choiceS than during choiceo (Engel, 2011). In line
with this, we observed a correlation between the difference in
EV sensitivity and situational (motivation to distribute money
equally as reported in a post-task question) and personality
(SDO score) variables indicating a preference for an equal
reward distribution. In other words, choice behavior of indi-
viduals with low (state and trait) motivation to distribute mon-
ey equally was more tuned to the EVs at stake during choiceS
than during choiceo, reflected in an increased EV sensitivity in
the former condition. Also, these data hint that a decreased
motivation during choiceO than during choiceS is not ubiqui-
tous but arises out of situational dispositions and personality
traits, which in turn are likely to be connected to cultural
factors. Considering constructs related to SDO, such as social
value orientation (capturing a tendency to distribute resources
equally; Van Lange, 1999) and self-reported altruism
(Rushton, Chrisjohn, & Fekken, 1981), an interesting question
is whether these constructs play any role in the effect on EV
sensitivity found here when comparing choiceS and choiceO.
These constructs may explain additional variance of the effect,
or even mediate the relationship between SDO and the effect.
A second factor that may contribute to the difference in EV
sensitivity depends on a lack of information about the other
person. This implies that, during choiceO as compared to
choiceS, participants were likely to be more uncertain about
the preferences of the other person than about their own pref-
erences, and hence they were more uncertain about whether or
not to gamble with different EVs. Our study did not aim to
assess the role of uncertainty about others, and further research
is needed to elucidate the role played by this factor during
choices made for other individuals.
Although choiceO and choiceS differed in terms of EV sen-
sitivity, the distance between average gambling and 50%—
which is another index of choice stochasticity—was not dif-
ferent across conditions. The finding of a specific effect on EV
sensitivity can be potentially explained calling upon the no-
tion of motivation but also of uncertainty. One can argue that
tuning choice to the EV at stake on a trial-by-trial basis
(expressed in the EV sensitivity) requires higher motivation
than does establishing whether or not gambling is a good
strategy overall (expressed in the distance from 50% gam-
bling). This can explain why a difference in motivation be-
tween choiceO and choiceS translates to a specific difference in
EV sensitivity (being the latter the aspect most affected by
motivation). Alternatively, one can argue that the evaluation
processes engaged to establish when to gamble as a function
of EV (underlying the EV sensitivity) are more complex than
the processes engaged to establish whether gambling is overall
a good strategy or not (underlying the distance from 50%
gambling). This would imply that uncertainty on another in-
dividual’s preferences would impact especially on EV sensi-
tivity (assuming one is more uncertain about more complex
processes), predicting higher EV sensitivity during choiceS
than during choiceO.
Like some previous studies, in our task participants were
not given information about the person they were choosing on
behalf, an aspect important when evaluating the ecological
validity of our results. We note many important ecological
scenarios in which this information is scarce, usually because
the decision is made on behalf of several other people. For
example, in finance and politics, information on individual
shareholders and voters, respectively, is minimal (a manager
knows almost nothing about the specific utility function or
risk preference of each individual shareholder). We argue that
our task mimic these scenarios in which the decision-maker
makes choice on behalf of another person and has scarce
knowledge on her individual preferences. In other circum-
stances, information about the other person is available.
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Previous literature has shown that, when choosing on behalf
of another person, the decision-maker takes into consider-
ations the other person’s preferences inferred on the basis of
the available information (Daruvala, 2007).
Most previous studies adopting monetary payoffs have ob-
served an increased risk aversion during choices for the self
than for choices for an anonymous individual (Chakravarty
et al., 2011; Hsee & Weber, 1997; Mengarelli et al., 2014;
Pollai & Kirchler, 2012; Pollmann et al., 2014; but see
Eriksen & Kvaløy, 2009; Reynolds et al., 2009). However,
previous literature has not examined separately the contribu-
tion of a baseline gambling propensity (corresponding to the
average gambling proportion) and a gambling preference de-
pendent on EV (corresponding to the signed beta weight re-
lated to EV in a logistic regression model of choice). These
two measures were orthogonal in our task, enabling us to
assess their specific contribution. When comparing choiceS
versus choiceo, decisions were characterized by a reduced
baseline gambling propensity, but gambling did not increase
for larger EVs nor it increased for smaller EVs (i.e., the signed
EV-related beta weight did not differ). Though our study is not
informative on why a difference in baseline gambling
emerges, previous research suggests some possibilities.
Recent studies have highlighted a baseline risk propensity
factor independent of the EV at stake (Rigoli, Rutledge,
Chew, et al., 2016; Rutledge, Skandali, Dayan, & Dolan,
2015). Such a baseline risk propensity may reflect an individ-
ual bias for the subjective probability of the best outcome of a
gamble (Rigoli, Rutledge, Chew, et al., 2016). This would
imply an increased subjective probability attributed to the best
outcome of the gamble during choices made for other people,
resulting in an inflated optimism bias in this condition (Sharot,
Guitart-Masip, Korn, Chowdhury, & Dolan, 2012).
The distribution of reward in a particular context influences
value attribution and choice, entailing that the very same re-
ward can be perceived as more valuable in a low-reward con-
text (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Kőszegi & Rabin, 2006;
Louie et al., 2013; Martinelli et al., 2018; Rigoli et al., 2018;
Rigoli, Friston, & Dolan, 2016; Rigoli, Friston, Martinelli,
et al., 2016; Rigoli, Mathys, Friston, & Dolan, 2017; Rigoli,
Rutledge, Chew, et al., 2016; Rigoli, Rutledge, Dayan, &
Dolan, 2016; Stewart, 2009; Stewart et al., 2006). In addition
to the individual context, living with other people creates so-
cial contexts (determined by the reward distribution available
to others) that also might influence how an individual evalu-
ates rewards and makes choice. In our task, the context of the
self affected choiceS but not choiceO, while the context of the
other person affected choiceO but not choiceS. This extends
previous findings showing that individuals take the context of
another person into account during choiceO, indicating the
reward for others is evaluated relative to the context.
Previous studies have shown that other people’ reward af-
fected subjective well-being and value-based choice (Boyce
et al., 2010; Clark & Oswald, 1996; Luttmer, 2005; Rutledge
et al., 2016). However, our data did not show any evidence for
an influence of the context of the other during choiceS (though
we emphasize that further research is required to test for small-
er effect sizes). This might be explained by the fact that the
context of another person influences an individual’s own
choices only when the context of the self and other are depen-
dent, as in previous studies (Blake et al., 2015; Blanco,
Engelmann, & Normann, 2011; Charness & Rabin, 2002;
Engelmann, 2012; Fehr & Schmidt, 1999; Rutledge et al.,
2016). Conversely, a lack of influence may characterize con-
ditions under which the two contexts are independent, as in
our task. In other words, these data raise the possibility that an
impact of the reward available to other people on choiceS and
well-being should be expected only when the context of the
self and of the other are interdependent, for example when
differences are perceived as unfair or when the level of reward
of others is thought to affect the level of reward for the self.
In sum, we show that individuals are more tuned to the option
features during choiceS than during choiceo, and that this effect
correlates with trait and state variables capturing a motivation to
distribute rewards equally or unequally. We also observed that
individuals are more attracted by risk during choiceo than during
choiceS. Finally, we found the context of the self affects choiceS
but not choiceO, whereas the context of the other person affects
choiceO but not choiceS. This indicates that in our task partici-
pants segregate reward representations for self and for other, and
raises the possibility that context of the other may affect choiceS
only if the context of the self and the context of the other are
interdependent. The findings highlight processes that impact
choices made for other people, and this may have implications
for how decisions are made in social contexts such as in finance.
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